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Introduction 
Do moral obligations include all the good that can be possibly achieved? 
Does every instance of the good always entail obligatory performance? 
Supererogation is a moral concept that tries to address this claim, by pointing 
out the existence of a category of morally relevant good acts that go beyond 
the call of duty. Paradigmatic examples of this category of acts are represented 
by deeds of heroism and sanctity, where the agent is sacrificing herself in order 
to benefit the others in an exemplary way. However, supererogation is not 
limited to extreme and utmost cases of generosity, but it has much to do with 
our everyday life. From a moral point of view, making a small donation to the 
local children‘s hospital is considered to be morally good, but optional.    
The renewal of philosophical interest for the concept emerged in the late 
1950s, when James O. Urmson published his essay entitled Saints and Heroes1.  
From that moment on, the debate on supererogation is mainly concerned with 
the following questions: 
- The definition of the concept and the delineation of the defining 
features of a supererogatory act; 
- The compatibility of the concept with existing normative theories. In 
particular, Kantian Ethics, Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics; 
- The application of the concept to specific acts.  
 
1 Urmson J. O., ‘Saints and Heroes’ in Melden A.I. (edited by), Essays in Moral Philosophy, 
University of Washington Press, 1958. 
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David Heyd, with his Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, has been 
one of the first authors to address all these issues in a complete work2 and 
many of his original arguments are still the point of reference for the current 
debate.  
From a philosophical point of view, the peculiar aspect of supererogation is 
that it entails some paradoxes about the moral framework. In particular, the 
so-called paradox of supererogation is especially relevant for the justification of 
the concept: why some instances of the good are not morally required as 
duties? Anti-supererogationists claim that this conclusion is simply untenable 
(the good and the ought cannot be untied).  On the other hand, supporters of 
supererogation need to provide an account of how the good and moral duties 
do not coincide.  
 
The Two Levels of the Normative Dimension 
If we want to make sense of supererogation, there is a fundamental aspect of 
morality that needs to be acknowledged: the normative sphere of morality is 
constituted by two distinct levels. These are the deontic and the axiological3. 
Any supererogationist account is conceptually connected to the fact that the 
good is not fully exhausted by the deontic sphere of morality. This is what 
makes possible to pursue that extra good that lies within the axiological 
dimension. Hence, this latter moral dimension expresses an open-ended 
character that allows to moral acts to exhibit much more goodness than the 
minimum required.  
The term “supererogation” found its first appearance in the parable of the 
Good Samaritan4. While it is widely accepted that this parable is the 
etymological origin of the concept, it is not clear, from the moral point of view, 
if the Samaritan has performed any act of supererogation. Rescuing a stranger 
whose life is in danger after being assaulted by the bandits is an act that seems 
to be morally required. The Samaritan’s omission to rescue the stranger would 
have represented a case of refusal of first aid. It is much more likely that the 
actual instance of supererogation is represented by the fact that the Samaritan is 
 
2 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Some others noteworthy publications have followed, including Gregory Mellema’s work a few 
years later. Mellema, G., Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence, 
State University of New York Press, 1991. 
3 For further analysis of this point see Heyd D., Supererogation, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Zalta E. N. (ed. by), URL = 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/supererogation/. 
4 Luke, 10:25-37. 
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offering to pay to the innkeeper every extra expense of the rescued man5. 
However, from the philosophical point of view, it should be noted that what 
makes supererogation possible is the assumption that morality is two-faced (the 
deontic and the axiological). In this regards, there is another passage of the 
Gospel that turns out to be particularly significant for this point: the parable of 
the Young Rich Man6. Theologically, this parable represents the conceptual 
origin of the famous distinction between precepts and counsels. In particular, 
after Jesus has listed to the young man the main rules already contained in the 
Old Law, the text reads as follows:   
20 The young man said to him, “All these I have kept. What do I still 
lack?” 21 Jesus said to him, “If you would be perfect, go, sell what you 
possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and 
come, follow me.” 
These lines entail a moral framework that is twofold. The minimum 
required is exhibited by the requirements of the Old Law, i.e. the Decalogue. 
Moreover, this passage suggests that there is some extra good that can be 
achieved by going beyond these precepts. Counsels point out all those 
instances of the good that lie beyond the merely required and, as such, stand 
as the way to aim at moral perfection. As the works of many Christian 
theologians show, the concept of supererogation has had a prominent role in 
the fervent theological debate about precepts and counsels in the following 
centuries.  
The important aspect to be considered, then, is that a morality conceived as 
being composed by two parts is the fundamental premise for any account of 
supererogation. That is, we need to acknowledge the twofold framework of the 
normative sphere if we want to make sense of supererogatory acts. Moral 
goodness is not an exclusive neither of the deontic nor of the axiological 
sphere of morality. The theological origin of the concept within the Christian 
thought highlights this theoretical prerequisite of the concept. A consequence, 
a philosophical account of supererogation cannot but start by providing the 
same theoretical framework that gave origin to the concept. 
 
Introduction to the present issue of Ethics and Politics 
The present monograph issue of Ethics and Politics entitled Supererogation 
and the Limits of Moral Obligations aims at providing a good example of the 
most updated lines of research about the concept of supererogation. In 
 
5 Luke, 10:35. 
6 Matthew, 19:16-22. 
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presenting the issue, I am particularly glad to acknowledge how the papers 
presented, not only express a variety of different topics, but also a significant 
diversity in the countries of origin of the authors. This does not only show how 
the debate on supererogation is well articulated, but it also highlights how 
much the debate is widespread across universities and research centers.  
The articles cover wide-ranging topics that include questions about the 
definition of the concept, its metaethical foundations, its relation with other 
moral concepts, its consonance with existing normative theories, its possible 
further development, and its applicability in the field of applied ethics.  
I want to thank the journal’s Editorial Board for assigning to me the role of 
Invited Editor and for giving space and visibility to the debate on 
supererogation. Finally, I want to thank the authors of the papers for their 
trust, patience and hard work. If this issue contains worth reading material 
(and I am sure it does), it is mostly thanks to their job. 
 
